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Meeting of the Interdepartmental Group  
on Chemical and Biological Weapons Arms Control

January 14, 1983

PRINCIPAL PARTICIPANTS

State

Robert Dean (PM)  
Chairman

NSC

Sven Kraemer

ACDA

James George  
Ambassador Fields

OMB

Joe Campbell

CIA



OSD

Michael G. MacDonald

JCS

BG Jack Nicholson

DISCUSSION: The IG met at 1:10 PM to:

- (1) consider the status of efforts to convene a conference of states parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.
- (2) review the proposed paper containing detailed U.S. views on a complete chemical weapons ban, for presentation in the upcoming session of the Committee on Disarmament.
- (3) consider the US position on the Committee on Disarmament mandate on chemical weapons for its upcoming session.

ACDA Acting Director James George briefed the IG on the on-going US-UK-Sweden consultations regarding preparation for a conference of states parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. The IG noted with satisfaction the objectives and proposed schedule of preparatory meetings and consultations.

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The IG then reviewed the paper containing detailed United States views on a complete chemical weapons ban and considered of the United States position on the Committee on Disarmament mandate on chemical weapons for its 1983 session.

In order to enhance United States national security interests, and specifically, to promote our policy objectives in the area of chemical weapons arms control, the IG unanimously agreed to recommend that, following the February 1 opening of the Committee on Disarmament's (CD) 1983 session, the United States:

- (1) Table, in the CD, the document entitled "U.S. Detailed Views on the Contents of a Chemical Weapons Ban," dated January 14, 1982; and
- (2) Support initiation of CD negotiations in the Committee's Chemical Weapons Working Group on a complete and verifiable chemical weapons ban focused on development of effective verification and compliance arrangements.

With respect to the status of the paper entitled, "U.S. Detailed Views on the Content of a Chemical Weapons Ban," it was further unanimously agreed that:

-- the paper should serve as a framework for discussion and as the basis for U.S. participation in CD negotiations on a chemical weapons arms control agreement;

-- the paper is subject to modification and further refinement, as deemed appropriate to safeguard U.S. security and foreign policy interests; and thus

-- the paper can not constitute a formal United States negotiating position on a proposal for the actual text of any eventual agreement in this area.

With respect to United States policy on CD negotiations on a chemical weapons ban, the IG also unanimously agreed that:

-- the United States should continue to focus efforts in the CD primarily on developing effective verification and compliance arrangements for a complete chemical weapons ban;

-- verification and compliance arrangements, beyond those set forth in the paper "U.S. Detailed Views on the Content of a Chemical Weapons Ban," need to be formulated and negotiated in the CD to reduce risks from undetected evasion; and

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-- the United States should not support or participate in drafting of actual treaty text until an effective verification and compliance framework, acceptable to the United States, has been negotiated.

It was the IG's understanding that a United States decision to support CD negotiations on a complete chemical weapons ban:

-- requires that the modernization of short-and-long range chemical weapons needs to proceed on a urgent basis to enable the United States to gain negotiating leverage in the area of chemical weapons arms control, and so that the United States has a credible and effective deterrent/retalitory capability until such time as a complete and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons has been obtained;

-- will require that we continue to make the direct connection between Soviet and Soviet surrogate use of toxin and other chemical weapons in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia and the essentiality of effective verification and compliance measures in any future chemical weapons agreement;

-- would be made without prejudice to decisions the United States may make concerning initiation of CD negotiations in area or on issues other than chemical weapons control.

The meeting adjourned at 1:45 pm.

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